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In 1982 nonprofit organizations received some $5.5 billion in charitable 
bequests. Though they typically amount to less than a tenth of the size of 
contributions by living individuals, these bequests have almost always ex- 
ceeded the total of corporate contributions (see Giving U.  S. A. 1983, p. 
36). In certain areas, notably private foundations and higher education, 
bequests are an extremely important source of philanthropic support. In 
contrast to the numerous econometric analyses of individual and corpo- 
rate contributions, there has been only a limited amount of empirical 
work to explain charitable bequests. This may have more to do with the 
limited amount of appropriate data than with any assessment of the rela- 
tive importance of bequests. In any case, a major objective  of this chapter 
is to discuss previous work as well as to present new findings regarding the 
effect of federal taxation on bequests. 
The first section of the chapter describes the federal tax structure af- 
fecting charitable bequests, and the second provides a statistical overview 
of the extent and distribution of such bequests. The third section describes 
the methods and results of previous econometric analyses of charitable 
bequests. The fourth section provides new estimates of the tax effects on 
bequests using a sample of 1976 estate tax returns. The final section pre- 
sents a brief discussion of the likely effects of several proposed changes in 
the estate tax. 
6.1  The Estate Tax 
The present federal estate tax was adopted in 1916, although there were 
transfer taxes on inheritances and estates at various times in the nine- 
teenth century (Pechman 1977, p. 222). The tax base consists of  assets 
222 223  Charitable Bequests 
owned by the decedent at time of death plus certain lifetime gifts less fu- 
neral and administrative expenses, certain debts, a deduction for certain 
property passing to the decedent’s spouse, and a charitable deduction. 
This charitable deduction may include some lifetime gifts (to the extent 
that such gifts are included in gross estate), but charitable bequests make 
up most of the deduction. Following Sunley (1977, p. 2320), therefore, the 
amount of this deduction is referred to in this chapter as charitable be- 
quests. Like the charitable deduction in the income tax, the estate tax 
charitable deduction covers bequests to nonprofit charities, government 
agencies,  foundations,  and the like. Unlike the income tax provision, 
though, there is no limit to the estate tax deduction, and gifts to foreign 
charities are not disallowed.  I 
In addition to these deductions, the estate tax is reduced by several tax 
credits, the most important of which is a “unified” credit that in 1977 re- 
placed an exemption of $60,000. From 1943 to 1976, the $60,000 exemp- 
tion applied to all returns, and the tax rate schedule was fixed in nominal 
terms, with rates ranging from 3 to 77 percent. Shoup (1966, p. 5) notes 
that, with the exception of the related gift tax, “the stability of the nomi- 
nal rate scale and the exemption level of the estate tax over two and a half 
decades is without parallel in any significant federal, state, or local tax in 
the same period.” The Tax Reform Act of 1976 modified the rate sched- 
ule, producing a top rate of 70 percent, and substituted the unified credit 
for the exemption, providing for it to grow over time (1980 U.  S. Muster 
Tax Guide 1979, p. 29). The size of this unified credit made it equivalent to 
a much larger exemption. For example, the minimum estate size required 
to be subject toathe tax doubled in 1977 from $60,000 to $120,667 as a re- 
sult of the credit. In addition, the credit was increased over time under the 
1976 legislation. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 extended the 
1976 act by further increasing the unified credit and again cutting the top 
tax rate over a four-year period, to 50 percent (Internal Revenue Code 
1982, sec. 2001, p. 847). In addition, the 1981 act removed the previous 
limit of 50 percent of the estate that had applied to the marital deduction, 
making it an unlimited deduction.2 
6.1.1 
In order to compare the effective rate schedule of the estate tax over 
time, it is of course necessary to account for inflation. In particular, the 
stability of  the nominal tax schedule between  1943  and  1976 masks a 
steady erosion in the real value of the exemption as well as an increase in 
Effective Tax Schedules over Time 
1. See Shoup 1966, pp. 60-61; and Pechman 1977. 
2. InternalRevenueCode 1982, pp. 846-48. Between 1971 and 1981, the marital deduction 
was limited by the greater of $50,000 or one-half of the adjusted gross estate (U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1976,  Estate TauReturns 1979 p. 5). 224  Charitable Bequests 
progessivity, as the real bracket widths diminished over time.3  Table 6.1 il- 
lustrates the effect of inflation on the real exemption level, which is effec- 
tively the minimum estate that can be taxed, as well as on the real tax rate 
schedule. The impact is especially evident over the thirty-four years be- 
tween 1943 and 1976. During the period prices rose two-and-a-half times. 
The value of the exemption in 1972 dollars fell from about $166,000 to 
$45,338 over the period. The 1976 legislation put an end to this deteriora- 
tion, however, by increasing the real filing level to some $86,000 in 1977 
and  to almost  $90,000 in  1981. The effective exemption level  was  in- 
creased still more by  the  1981 act. By  1987 the filing requirement was 
scheduled to rise to $228,000 in 1972 dollars, well above the 1942 level in 
real terms. Over the period 1943 to 1987, therefore, inflation and legisla- 
tion have combined to cause a gradual decline, followed by a steep rise, in 
the size of the minimum estate subject to the estate tax. 
The last three columns of  table 6.1 show the marginal tax rate that 
would apply to estates (after deductions but before the exemption) of given 
real amounts over time. For example, an estate of $500,000  in 1972 dollars 
would be $180,700 in 1943 dollars, yielding a taxable estate of $120,700 
after the exemption. This taxable estate fell into the 30 percent rate bracket. 
Over the period of  fixed nominal rate schedules, 1943 to 1976, marginal 
rates for each real estate size rose, the greatest increase being the rise ap- 
plying to a $5,000,000 estate-45  to 70 percent. The projected trends fol- 
lowing the 1976 tax law reveal a more complex pattern. For the $500,000 
estate rates are projected to rise from 35 to 43 percent. At the higher estate 
levels, however, rates will fall, from 53 to 50 percent at $2,000,000 and 
from 70 tr~  50 percent at $5,000,000. While the legislation of  1976 and 
1981 has the effect of reducing the number of estates covered by the tax, 
therefore, the marginal rates have not been cut uniformly. For many es- 
tates, the marginal tax rates in the 1980s will be as high as at any time since 
1943 for estates of equal real value. 
A major effect of the erosion in the real exemption level up until 1976 
was a gradual expansion in the coverage of the estate tax. As table 6.2 
shows, the number of estate tax returns increased from about 14,300 in 
1943 to over 200,000 in 1976. As a percentage of all deaths in the country, 
these returns grew from 1  .O to 10.5 percent over the period. There is little 
doubt, given the tax legislation of 1976 and 1981, that 1976 will represent 
a peak in coverage for the estate tax for at least some time to come. In con- 
trast to measures of coverage based on the number of individuals, it is 
much more difficult to determine the proportion of the total wealth of de- 
cedents in any one year represented by the estate tax base. Pechman (1977, 
p. 225) estimated that before 1977 the taxable portion of the estate tax 
3. See Clotfelter 1984 for a discussion of  the relationship between inflationary bracket 
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aMinimum exemption level that would result in zero tax with no unified credit. For 1977 to 1981, 1980 U.S.  Muster Tux  Guide 1979, p. 29; for 1982 to 1987, 
calculations from estate tax tables. 
bExemption or equivalent exemption deflated by GNP price deflator (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1983, p. 166). 
‘Refers to 1972 value of gross estate after deductions but before any exemption. Marginal tax rates were calculated using the nominal value for each real es- 
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base represented less than a quarter of the total wealth of decedents. Other 
evidence suggests that using the gross estate measure, estate tax returns 
may account for more than half of the aggregate estate of all  decedent^.^ 
In sum, while fewer than a tenth of all decedents file estate tax returns, 
these returns account for a significant portion of  the total estate being 
transferred in any one year. 
Table 6.2 also shows that the tax’s expanded coverage was accompanied 
by  an increase in total reported charitable bequests. Between 1943 and 
1976 such bequests grew from $202 million to $3.0 billion, almost four- 
and-a-half  times.  The average charitable bequest fell over the period, 
however, as the tax expanded over time to include less wealthy decedents. 
In 1972 dollars, the average fell from about $39,000 in 1943 to $1 1,300 in 
1976. As a percentage of gross estate, which corresponds roughly to total 
assets at death, charitable bequests ranged from a high of 7.8 percent in 
1969 to a low of 4.2 percent in 1949. 
6.1.2  Lifetime Gifts and Trusts 
In addition to the tax schedule itself, charitable bequests are also affected 
by the gift tax and the various tax provisions related to trusts. The gift tax 
is a progressive levy applied to lifetime (inter vivos) gifts that exceed an 
annual e~emption.~  Before 1977 the gift tax had a separate schedule, but 
now the gift and estate taxes are assessed as a unified transfer tax with a 
single schedule.6 Since charitable gifts are deductible in the gift tax as are 
charitable bequests in the estate tax, the major practical importance of the 
gift tax for charitable giving lies in its role as protector of the estate tax. 
Without the gift tax, individuals could arrange to dispose of their wealth 
before death through gifts, thus escaping the estate tax and undercutting 
any incentive effect of the estate tax’s charitable deduction. 
Charitable giving is also affected by the tax treatment of  trusts, both 
charitable and noncharitable. The tax treatment of charitable trusts and 
4. David and Menchik (1981, table 2) present a sample of estates of husbands between 
1947 and 1978, which can be used to give a very rough idea of the distribution of all estates. 
The percentages of estates in each net estate category were: no  estate: 25.2 percent; $0-5,000: 
12.7; $5,000-10,000:  14.6; $10,000-20,000:  23.1; $20,000-50,000:  16.7; $50,000 or more: 
7.7. A weighted average of wealth was calculated using the midpoints of the first five cate- 
gories, $50,000 for 0.8 percent of  decedents, and $221,425 for the remaining 6.9 percent of 
decedents (corresponding to the average gross estate for estate tax returns in 1969). By  this 
calculation, estate tax returns accounted for approximately 65 percent of the total estates of 
decedents. 
5. In 1981 the exemption was raised from $3,000  to $10.000 per taxpayer (Sugarman and 
Feinberg 1981, p. 4). 
6. Before 1977 the gift tax rates were generally three-fourths of the corresponding estate 
tax rates, although the gift tax rates applied to gifts net of the tax whereas the estate tax rates 
applied to  the estate before the tax. In addition, gifts made within three years of death were 
usually counted as being made “in contemplation of death” in the pre-1977 law, but excep- 
tions were possible (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income--1976,  Estate Tax 
Returns 1979, p. 5). See also Shoup 1966, Pechman 1977, or Sunley 1977. Table 6.2  Estate Tax Returns, Gross Estate, and Charitable Bequests, Selected Years (dollar amounts in billions) 
Year 
Charitable Bequests 
Estate Tax  As Percentage  Gross  Charitable  as Percentage of 
Returns  of Deaths  Estate  Bequests  Gross Estate 
1943  14.3  I .o  2,908  201.9  6.9 
1947  23.4  1.6  4,775  223.1  4.8 
1948  24.6  1.7  4,933  296.2  6.0 
1949  25.9  1.8  4,918  205.9  4.2 
1950  28.0  1.9  5,505  274.4  5.0 
1953  36.7  2.4  7,412  354.5  4.8 
1954  36.5  2.5  7,467  397.8  5.3 
1958  46.5  2.8  1 1,648  668.9  5.7 
1960  64.5  3.8  14,622  950.8  6.5 
1962  78.4  4.4  17,007  876.0  5.2 
1965  97.3  5.3  21,757  1,309.5  6.0 
1969  133.9  6.9  27,445  2,132.1  7.8 
1972  174.9  8.9  38,869  1,998.1  5.1 
1976  200.7  10.5  48,202  2,993.9  6.2 
Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income, Estute TawReturns, various years; data on deaths from U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1982, part A, p. 1, table 1.1. 228  Charitable Bequests 
split-interest trusts is  discussed in chapter 2. Noncharitable trusts also 
may have effects on giving. Probably the most important effect that non- 
charitable trusts can have is to blunt the effect of high statutory estate tax 
rates, most notably in the “generation-skipping” trust. Because the cre- 
ation of a trust involves no transfer of property subject to the estate tax 
until the trust’s termination, a trust can be used to avoid estate taxation. 
By designating his wife and/or his children to receive income as “life ten- 
ants” of a trust, a man can allow some of his heirs to receive the income 
from this property without paying estate tax. Only when the remainder in- 
terest is received, possibly by grandchildren, is estate tax paid. Although 
two generations of heirs benefit from the bequest, there is only one transfer 
that is subject to estate taxation.’ Any incentive effect that the estate tax 
charitable deduction might otherwise have thus tends to be weakened 
when such trusts are used. Other than this possible blunting of the price 
effect of the estate tax, it is impossible to identify precisely the effect of 
trust use on charitable bequests. McNees (1973, p. 82) suggests that chari- 
table bequests and trusts are alternative means of tax reduction and, as 
such, may be complements or substitutes.  To view charitable bequests 
merely as a tax-reduction device is simplistic, however, since the net estate 
passed on to heirs is reduced by such gifts. Whatever the exact relation- 
ship between charitable bequests and the use of trusts, it seems likely that 
decisions regarding them are made simultaneously in the process of estate 
planning,  whether  or not  trusts  have charitable interests written into 
them. 
In order to give some idea of the typical composition of trusts, table 6.3 
gives the distribution of remainder interests for trusts created by million- 
aires in 1957. For trusts that provided income to the spouse during his or 
her life, over half of the dollar value was designated to go to the children 
following the death of the spouse. By  contrast, about 6 percent of the value 
of such trusts went to charity, and less than 1 percent had both a charitable 
remainder and a remainder interest for children. For generation-skipping 
trusts that made the decedent’s children the sole life tenants, grandchil- 
dren received four-fifths of  the total value while charities accounted for 
about  1 percent. The use of trusts increases with estate size; and among 
those trusts that are established in lower- and middle-size estate categor- 
ies, the most common form is that which provides lifetime income to the 
spouse and the remainder interest to the children (Jantscher 1967, pp. 83, 
71). Finally, married or widowed decedents are more likely to employ the 
trust form than those who are single or divorced (Shoup 1966, p. 173, ta- 
ble B-ll). 
7.  For discussions of the role of trusts, see Shoup 1966, pp. 33-45 or Jantscher 1967. 229  Charitable Bequests 
Table 6.3  Distribution of  Remainder Interests of  Trusts Created by Millionaires 
in 1957 (dollar amounts in thousands) 
Type of Trust 
~ 
Surviving Spouse  Children Sole 
Sole Life Tenant  Life Tenants 











$  52,427  51.2 
3,729  3.6 
6,495  6.3 
609  0.6 
39,045  38.2 
$102,305  99.9 
- 
$  949  0.6 
121,582  19.5 
1,418  0.9 
513  0.3 
28,552  18.7 
$153,014  100.0 
-  - 
Source:  Robert Anthoine,  “Testamentary Trusts,”  in Shoup 1966, Appendix  B, pp.  167, 
168. 
6.2  The Distribution of Charitable Bequests 
Before turning to econometric analysis of charitable bequests, it is use- 
ful to describe the size and distribution of such bequests in general terms. 
One of the most striking aspects of bequest giving is the tremendous in- 
equality in the sjze of gifts. Even more than lifetime charitable giving, be- 
quest giving is dominated by a relatively tiny number of  wealthy individ- 
uals.  Not only do a relatively few  estates ever get taxed,  only a small 
minority  of  those whose estates are big enough to be taxed make any 
charitable bequests at all. At the other end, a few decedents make very 
large gifts indeed. In 1980 and 1981, for example, the bequests of the larg- 
est five donors accounted for 1  .O and 1.2 percent of all bequests national- 
ly.  In 1982 the largest five bequests added up to an astonishing 26.5 per- 
cent of the total.* 
Table 6.4 presents summary data based on estate tax returns filed  in 
1977. For the most part, these were returns for individuals who died in 
1976 and whose estates were subject to the 1976 tax law. Since decedents 
with estates less than $60,000 were not subject to tax, there were no re- 
turns for a majority of estates. Of  the 200,741 returns that were filed, 
about 70 percent were taxable.  Total charitable bequests amounted to 
8. The top five bequests included a gift of  $I .3 billion by J. Paul Getty and four gifts total- 
ling $145 million (Giving  U.S.A. 1983, pp. 18-19;  1981, pp. 12-13; and 1982, pp. 15-16). See 




Returns  Charitable Bequests  Average 
Percentage with  As Percentage  Tax Rate 
Total  Charitable  Amount  of Gross  Marginala  after 
Number  Bequests  (millions)  Estate  Tax Rate  Creditsa 
Taxable returns 
$60 under 70 
$70 under 80 
$80 under 90 
$90 under 100 
$100 under 120 
$120 under 150 
$150 under 200 
$200 under 300 
$300 under 500 
$500 under 1000 
$1000 under 2000 
$2000 under 3000 
$3000 under 5000 
$5000 under 10,000 































































































16.0 -  -  Nontaxable  61,632  10.7  681.1  8.9 
$60 under 70 
$70 under 80 
$80 under 90 
$90 under 100 
$100 under 120 
$120under 150 
$150 under 200 
$200 under 300 
$300 under 500 
$500 under loo0 

















































6.2  10.3 
Source: US.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-I976,  Estate Tax Returns 1979, pp. 15-17, table 1. 
aBased on 1976 law. Average tax rates are based on gross estate. 232  Charitable Bequests 
$3.0 billion, of which $2.3 billion was claimed on taxable returns. The 
proportion of returns claiming the charitable deduction was 12.2 percent 
overall and 12.8 percent for taxable returns. The inequality in the size of 
charitable bequests is amply illustrated in the table. The 90 taxable estates 
over $10 million, representing only 0.04 percent of estate tax returns, ac- 
counted for 47 percent of all reported bequests. In summary, the bulk of 
charitable bequests come from a relatively small number of large estates. 
One of the most striking features of table 6.4  is the tendency for the ra- 
tio of charitable bequests to gross estate to rise with estate size. For tax- 
able returns, charitable bequests rose from 5 percent of gross estate in the 
lowest class to 72 percent in the highest. For nontaxable returns it in- 
creased from 10 to 76 percent. This increasing propensity for charitable 
giving is consistent with the notion that wealthier individuals, being able 
to provide adequately for heirs with more left over are in a better position 
to leave bequests to charitable  organization^.^ A survey of married men 
with net assets over $100,000 produced  other corroborating data. The 
proportion of those men planning to leave their wives with less than half 
of their estate was highest for those with the largest incomes and presum- 
ably the largest estates (Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 184, table 23). 
An alternative explanation for the observed increasing propensity to 
make charitable bequests is that higher marginal tax rates induce more 
giving. Calculated at the class means, the marginal tax rate for taxable re- 
turns increased from 3 to 77  percent, reflecting the progressivity of the 
rate schedule. To what extent this marginal tax rate has a separate effect 
on charitable bequests can be determined only by multivariate statistical 
analysis.  , 
Not only do the amounts contributed differ by estate size, but the distri- 
bution  of  organizations  supported  by  charitable bequests also varies. 
Table 6.5 presents such a distribution for 1960, the last year for which 
data by type of organization are available. The types of donees listed are 
educational, scientific, and literary organizations, broken down by public 
and private, religious groups, and “other charitable”-a  residual cate- 
gory including bequests to private foundations. For all estate tax returns, 
“other” bequests accounted for 79 percent of all charitable bequests, com- 
pared to 9 percent for religious gifts. In a pattern similar to that observed 
for contributions by living individuals, the relative importance of reli- 
gious gifts falls as estate size grows. Bequests to religious organizations 
accounted for two-thirds of total charitable bequests in estates of $60,000 
to $70,000, falling to less than 1 percent for the largest estate classes. The 
proportion of gifts made to educational, scientific, and literary organiza- 
tions, principally colleges and universities, shows little clear relationship 
to estate size. Together they made up about 12 percent of charitable be- 
9. See Shoup (1966, p. 64) for a statement of this argument. 233  Charitable Bequests 
Table 6.5  Percentage Distribution of Charitable Bequests by Type of 
Recipient, 1960 




Estate Class  Other 
(thousands)  Public  Private  Religious  Charitable 
$60 under 70 
$70 under 80 
$80 under 90 
$90 under 100 
$100under 120 
$120under 150 
$150 under 200 
$200 under 300 
$300 under 500 
$500 under 1000 
$1000 under 2000 
$2000 under 3000 
$3000 under 5000 
$5000 under 10,000 
$10,000  under 20,000 






































































Source:  US.  Internal  Revenue Service, Statistics of Incorne-I960,  Estate  Tax  Returns 
1964, pp. 48-49,  table 3. 
quests in 1960, most of which went to private institutions. The residual 
category increased from 31 to 96 percent of charitable bequests. The por- 
tion of this category attributable to private foundations is impossible to 
ascertain, but the table certainly suggests an increasing use of  private 
foundations as estate sizes increase.’O 
6.3  Previous Studies 
The previous empirical analysis of  tax effects on charitable bequests 
consists principally of four econometric studies: analyses of individual es- 
tate tax returns by McNees (1973) and Boskin (1976), an analysis of aggre- 
gate tax return data by Feldstein (1977), and a study using probate records 
10. Shoup (1966, pp. 62-63) reports that in 1957,43 percent of the charitable bequests by 
estates over a million dollars went to “private” charitable organizations, and 41 percent in 
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by  Barthold  and  Plotnick  (1983). This section describes these studies 
briefly in order to give background for the new estimates presented in sec- 
tion 6.4. Following a discussion of the economic model of bequest giving, 
this section describes the data and findings of the previous studies. 
6.3.1 
Despite recent work seeking to explain patterns of bequests and wealth 
transmission, l1 economic analysis of bequest behavior is still a developing 
area of inquiry. As Boskin (1976) spells out in the most complete discus- 
sion of the theory of charitable bequests, the decision to bequeath assets 
to charity is a complex one, one that is related to an individual’s decisions 
regarding labor supply, savings, consumption, lifetime gifts, lifetime con- 
tributions, and noncharitable bequests. Boskin shows that even a simpli- 
fied utility function, including consumption, lifetime gifts, contributions, 
and charitable and noncharitable bequests, yields a system of  demand 
equations with a number of tax-determined prices. The equation he ob- 
tains for charitable bequests is: 
(1) 
CB  = f(K + (WH + rQ(1  -  my),  1/(1 - mg),  1 - my,  4/(l -  me),  4), 
where K is initial wealth,  WH is labor income, r corresponds roughly to 
the interest rate, q measures inflation relative to the interest rate, and my, 
mg,  and me  are applicable marginal tax rates in the income tax, the gift tax 
and the estate tax. Charitable bequests are thus seen as a function of labor 
supply (which Boskin assumed to be fixed for convenience), initial wealth, 
savings, and the relative prices  of  gifts,  bequests,  contributions,  and 
charitable bequests (Boskin 1976, pp. 29-32). 
A central variable in studies of  charitable bequests is  their price.  A 
model such as equation (1) makes it clear that there are a number of dif- 
ferent prices, expressed here relative to the “price” of  consuming a dol- 
lar’s worth of goods, namely l.  For example, the relative price of making 
lifetime gifts versus bequests involves not only the real rate of interest but 
also the effect of deductibility. A lifetime gift reduces lifetime tax as well 
as estate tax, whereas a bequest reduces the estate tax only. The models 
used for estimation focus instead on the price of making charitable be- 
quests relative to that of  making certain noncharitable bequests. Specifi- 
cally, the reference used is to noncharitable bequests other than to the tax- 
payer’s spouse (which is itself subject to a deduction). The typical price 
variable is thus the ratio of the price of charitable bequests (4)  to the price 
of noncharitable bequests (q/(l -  me)),  which is simply 1 -  me.  Consider 
an individual whose estate would be taxed at a 30 percent marginal rate. 
Because of the charitable deduction, a charitable bequest of $10,000 will 
Economic Models of Bequest Giving 
11. See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, pp. 85-88; or David and Menchik 1981, 
or Tomes 198  1. 235  Charitable Bequests 
cost the estate $7000 net of tax, while a similar bequest to a son or daugh- 
ter would cost a full $10,000. The price of the charitable bequest relative 
to the noncharitable bequest is 0.7, or one minus the marginal tax rate in 
the estate tax.I2 
Because of the increased number of  options as well as the inevitably 
metaphysical  nature  of  consumption decisions regarding  events after 
one’s death, this conception of  price is a good deal more complex than 
that in the case of lifetime contributions. By the same token, however, it 
should be remembered that gifts and bequests are alternative uses to con- 
sumption and contributions during life, so that the price of lifetime giving 
is in principle more complex than it is usually portrayed. As in other appli- 
cations, the proper complexity for a given model is dictated in part by the 
researcher’s judgment about the importance of various influences. By this 
criterion, it seems reasonable to  include in studies of both lifetime and be- 
quest giving only the most immediate relative price, although this appears 
to be a more important limitation in the case of bequests. 
The simple model discussed above is quite general as to behavioral as- 
sumptions and implied. functional form.  It implies that charitable be- 
quests are a function of wealth or estate size and the relative price of chari- 
table bequests. It would be as consistent with constant elasticities for price 
and estate size as it would with variable elasticities. One might imagine 
more specific behavioral assumptions about bequest giving. One possibil- 
ity is that an individual has a target amount of wealth that he wishes to 
pass on to his heirs. Any increase in taxes would come out of planned 
charitable gifts. Changes in the price of bequest giving would have no ef- 
fect on noncharitable bequests and thus would affect charitable bequests 
only through an increase in lifetime savings. Such behavior would imply a 
large wealth effect but no price effect on charitable bequests. An alterna- 
tive model of  bequest giving might be that individuals have a target in- 
stead for charitable giving. If  it is measured in terms of the gross dollar 
gift, then obviously changes in neither wealth nor price would have any ef- 
fect. If the target is measured in terms of the net cost to the estate, however, a 
fall in the price would be accompanied by an equiproportionate increase 
in charitable bequests.  Under these circumstances, the price elasticity 
would be -  1  .I3 Models of  bequest giving based on such targets are quite 
stylized and may be totally unrealistic, but it is useful to consider such spe- 
cial cases in evaluating estimated price and estate-size elasticities. The net 
cost target, for example, would provide a plausible explanation for a uni- 
tary price elasticity. The empirical work discussed in the remainder of the 
chapter embodies no assumptions regarding targets, but instead is based 
on a general model. 
12. See Feldstein (1977, p. 1500) for a discussion of the price. 
13. See Feldstein and Lindsey (1981) for a discussion of such behavior in the case of life- 
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6.3.2  Data and Variables 
McNees (1973) and Boskin (1976) employed estate tax files composed 
of information from individual returns. Both studies employed a sample 
of 1957 and 1959 returns that had been used in a special study of estate tax 
returns.I4 Variables on the file include estate size, state of residence, age, 
sex, marital status, an indirect measure of  dependents, the use of trusts, 
and gift giving. In addition, charitable contributions are broken down for 
four categories of recipient organizations: (a)  religious, (b)  educational, 
scientific, and literary, (c) social welfare and (6)  other. The 1969 file used 
by Boskin provided much the same information on estate size, age, sex, 
and marital status. It also provides more detail on the composition of as- 
sets. However, the 1969 file does not break down gifts by type of donee, 
nor is there information on trusts (Boskin 1976, p. 38). Both files provide 
ample information from which to calculate the marginal estate tax rate. 
The aggregate data used by Feldstein (1977) is sparse in detail, provid- 
ing only class means for estate size and charitable bequests. Following the 
procedure he used in his article on individual contributions (1975a), Feld- 
stein calculated marginal tax rates based on class averages for the taxable 
estate quantity. 
The measure of the decedent’s estate is a central variable in explaining 
charitable bequests, and several alternative measures are available. Gross 
estate is defined in the tax law to include “the value of  all property to the 
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death” (Zn- 
ternal Revenue Code 1982, sec. 2033). In addition, transfers made within 
three years of death were included in this calculation before the full unifi- 
cation ofthe estate and gift taxes. The estate generally could be valued as 
of the time of death or six months later, at the discretion of the estate’s ex- 
ecutor.Is Because it takes no account of most debts, gross estate can be a 
poor measure of economic wealth. This defect is remedied in the economic 
estate measure, which is defined as gross estate minus debts, administra- 
tive costs, funeral expenses, and lifetime gifts. Economic estate corre- 
sponds most closely with net worth available for disposition at time of 
death. A further modification can be made to subtract the estate tax liabil- 
ity  from  the  economic  estate,  leaving  adjusted  disposable  estate.  l6 
McNees used the economic estate measure. Boskin preferred adjusted dis- 
posable estate in analyzing the 1969 data. Feldstein, on the other hand, 
was forced by data limitations to use gross estate minus all deductions 
other than those for charity and marital bequests. 
14. See Shoup (1966) for a more complete description of the data. 
15. See US.  1979 Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1976,  Estate Tax Re- 
16. See Boskin (1976, pp.38-39) for a discussion of estate measures. 
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Although economic estate is the measure corresponding most closely to 
net worth at time of death, there is an important drawback to its use when 
the contributions deduction includes lifetime charitable transfers as well 
as charitable bequests. As previously noted, such lifetime gifts (generally 
those made within three years of death) are a small part of the charitable 
deduction on average. It is also believed that these charitable lifetime gifts 
are underreported since they have no tax consequence.”  But for individ- 
uals who do make and report large lifetime charitable gifts, the exclusion 
of lifetime gifts from the measure of estate (as in the economic estate or 
adjusted  disposable  estate  measures) will  understate  the  relevant  net 
worth while including the lifetime gift in the charitable deduction. A more 
appropriate measure of net worth is one that includes transfers made in 
the last three years of life. Accordingly, the basic measure of estate used in 
the analysis of the 1976 estate tax file presented in section 6.4  is economic 
estate plus lifetime transfers minus the estate tax, referred to as net estate. 
The basic price measure used in the studies is the marginal estate tax rate 
or one minus that rate. McNees, who simply used the marginal tax rate, 
was careful to specify the rate independently of the amount of charitable 
bequests in order to obtain consistent estimates (McNees 1973, p.  82). 
Boskin and Feldstein defined their price terms analogously, except that 
Boskin was able to obtain information on state as well as federal tax rates 
in his 1969 sample. 
6.3.3  Findings 
McNees 
Using the  1957-59 tax file, McNees estimated linear and logarithmic 
equations for charitable bequests, allowing estate size to enter quadrati- 
cally. He estimated separate equations for estates above and below a mil- 
lion dollars. His principal finding is that the marginal estate tax rate was 
significant for the large-estate group, suggesting “a sizable incentive ef- 
fect of  the contributions  deduction”  (p.  84). The lack of  information 
about the scale used in defining the variables makes it difficult to quantify 
this tax effect. McNees also found that bequests were strongly related to 
estate size. Charitable bequests tended to be lower for widows and those 
who used trusts; for large estates charitable giving tended to be positively 
related to inter vivos gift giving (McNees 1973, p. 83, table 1). 
Boskin 
As a result of preliminary regressions, Boskin used a simple dichoto- 
mous variable for decedents who were not married, rejecting other mari- 
tal status variables as insignificant. He also used a single dummy variable 
17. Their effect is to raise gross estate and deductions by the same amount. 238  Charitable Bequests 
for decedents under 65.  More importantly, he split the price variable into 
three pieces, allowing separate coefficients and elasticities for prices be- 
low 0.6,  between 0.6 and 0.8, and over 0.8.  An illustrative regression us- 
ing the 1969 sample and estimated using the Tobit procedure is given be- 
low: 
(2)  CB = 0.326ADE -  347 P(P  < 0.6) -  443 P(0.6 < P  < 0.8) 
-  668  P(P > 0.8) -  225 Married -  245 (Age < 65), 
where CB is charitable bequests, ADEis adjusted disposable estate, and P 
is the price defined by the marginal estate tax rate.I8 All coefficients are 
significantly different from zero.  The elasticity of  charitable bequests 
with respect to estate size, calculated at the means, is 0.40.  The price elas- 
ticity varies greatly, for  -0.20 for decedents with the largest estates (P 
~0.6)  to -  2.53 for those with smaller estates. 
Table 6.6 summarizes the elasticities of charitable bequests with respect 
to estate size and price for this and other basic specifications. Two specifi- 
cations for the 1957-59 sample included a single price term. The first, us- 
ing the economic estate variable, yielded an estate-size elasticity of 0.52 
and a price elasticity of -  1.2,  both calculated at the mean values. When 
adjusted disposable estate was substituted for economic estate, the estate 
elasticity rose to I.  1. One should be wary of the elasticities based on a sim- 
ple linear model, however. As Boskin (1976,  pp.  34-35)  notes,  such a 
model implies that a one percentage point rise in the price will cause the 
same dollar decrease in bequests in all estates, regardless of size. Breaking 
Table 6.6  Estimated Price and Estate Elasticities for Charitable Bequests 
(Boskin 1976) 
Sample 
1957-59  1969 
Economic estatea 
Price 
Adjusted disposable estateb 
Price 
Adjusted disposable estate 
Price < 0.6 
0.6 < Price < 0.8 
Price > 0.8 
0.52 
-  1.2 
1.1 
-  1.2 
0.54 
-  0.94 
-  1.4 
-  1.8 
0.40 
-  0.20 
-  0.96 
-  2.53 
Source: Boskin 1976: 1957-59, p. 41, table 2, equations (2)-(4);  1969, p. 45, table4, equation 
(1). 
aGross estate minus debts and expenses. 
bEconomic estate minus taxes that would be paid if there were no charitable bequests. 
18. The method of estimation was Tobit. The intercept was not given. 239  Charitable Bequests 
up the price term, as shown in equation (2), is one way to allow this price 
response to vary over estates of  different sizes. The elasticities based on 
this model are compared  in table 6.6 for both samples. Both imply a 
smaller price elasticity for the biggest estates, but this difference is less in 
the 1957-59 sample, with elasticities ranging from -  0.94 to -  1.8. Boskin 
found similar patterns of price elasticities when he divided charitable be- 
quests according to the type of donee. In average magnitude, the elastic- 
ities were largest for the residual category (Boskin 1976, p. 43), suggesting 
that the creation of private foundations may be especially sensitive to the 
charitable deduction in the estate tax. 
Feldstein 
Using a pooled time-series/cross-section sample of estate class averages 
over the period 1948 to 1963, Feldstein estimated models that allowed the 
price and estate-size elasticities to vary. The ratio of charitable bequests to 
estate size, or its logarithm, was the dependent variable, and independent 
variables were transformations of estate size and price. As in the Boskin 
study, the price was calculated for the first dollar of charitable bequests. 
State inheritance taxes were ignored by necessity since only national totals 
were available.  I9 
The estimated elasticities showed great variation, as shown in table 6.7. 
Based on data for all estate-size categories, the basic models (A) and (B) 
imply price elasticities ranging from -  4.0 to -  0.1. When an interaction 
term including the logarithm of the estate size was added, however, all es- 
timated price elasticities using this full sample were positive, and Feldstein 
rejects them as .being unreasonable. The price elasticities based on equa- 
tions for large estates only do yield uniformly negative elasticities, though 
the range of variation is still large. In evaluating the results, Feldstein ac- 
knowledges “the instability of the parameter estimates and the frequency 
of implausible estimates” (p. 1497) and concludes that the results provide 
little firm evidence regarding the magnitude of the price response.2o 
Barthold and Plotnick 
In the only study not using federal tax return data, Barthold and Plot- 
nick (1984) employed a sample of Connecticut estates probated during the 
1930s and 1940s. Gross estate was used as the measure of estate size, and 
tax price was defined as in earlier studies but including the state as well as 
the federal tax rate. From probate records the authors obtained informa- 
tion on the decedent’s heirs and religion. The authors used a logarithmic 
19. Feldstein notes (1977, p. 1487) that inheritance taxes in 1963 were relatively insignifi- 
cant in comparison to the federal estate tax. He calculated that the tax liability counting the 
federal estate tax, state transfer taxes, and federal credits was in no state greater than 1 per- 
cent more than the federal tax liability calculated without reference to state taxes. 
20. For his own assessment of the results, see his conclusion (Feldstein 1977, pp.  1495, 
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Table 6.7  Estimated  Price Elasticities  for Charitable Bequests (Feldstein 1977) 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Estate size 





$  500,000 
1,OW000 
5,~,000 
Equations  for  All Estates 
-  4.04  -  1.96  1 SO  2.01 
-  2.06  -  1.09  0.70  1.92 
-  1.45  -  0.69  0.54  2.48 
-  0.3  1  -0.11  0.18  2.00 
Equations  for Large Estates 
-  2.72  -  9.50  -  1.65  -  1.27 
-  2.05  -  6.42  -  1.40  -  0.92 
-0.58  -2.13  -  0.70  -0.19 
Source: Feldstein 1977, table 3 (2.1-2.3,2.6),  p. 1493 and table 7 (6.1-6.3,6.6), p. 1497. 
Note: Models are as follows: 
(A)G/E  = a + bP + cE; 
(B)G/E  = a + blP + b@  + clE + cS2; 
(C)G/E  = a + blP + b@  + clE + cS2  + c3PInE; 
(D) In(G/E)  = a + blP + b@  + CIE  + cS2  + c3P In  E. 
For each model, price is defined as PI, based on taxable estate plus charitable bequests. 
functional form and obtained estimates using Tobit. The estate-size elas- 
ticity implied by the estimates was 0.4. The estimate also indicated that de- 
cedents with a surviving spouse and more heirs tended to leave smaller 
charitable bequests. 
In contrast to most previous work, the tax price was not significant in 
any equation in the study. Barthold and Plotnick emphasize that the fed- 
eral and Connecticut estate tax schedules were changed several times dur- 
ing the period covered by the sample, thereby reducing the collinearity be- 
tween estate size and price. In particular, they note that the Connecticut 
law underwent a significant change in 1937, a year before a large propor- 
tion of the wills in their sample were probated. There were also changes in 
the federal tax schedule, notably in  1942, covering deaths in  1943 and 
after. These changes in law pose a problem, however. Unless individuals 
respond immediately to changes in the estate tax by revising their wills, 
some bequests will be a function of current tax laws while others will de- 
pend on past laws. This is especially serious where changes are large and 
time intervals are short. The result in this case is that the price term will be 
measured with error and its estimated coefficient will  be biased toward 
zero. Without further information about the process of estate planning, it 
is impossible to say how much bias this effect would have had for this par- 
ticular sample. 241  Charitable Bequests 
6.4  Analysis of 1976 Estate Tax Returns 
In order to extend the empirical analysis of charitable bequests using 
more recent data, I analyzed a sample of  federal estate tax returns  for 
1976. The basic data source was the 1976 estate tax file (U. S. Internal 
Revenue Service 1976) prepared by the Internal Revenue Service, a strati- 
fied random sample of all estate returns filed in 1977. Like the 1957-59 
and 1969 estate tax files used in earlier analyses, the 1976 file provides in- 
formation on estate size and composition, charitable gifts, other deduc- 
tions, age, and marital status. Based on the information provided, it is 
possible to calculate the federal estate tax and tax rate. A 20 percent ran- 
dom sample of  the file was drawn for use in the statistical analysis. A 
small portion of the returns included in the file in fact represented deaths 
in 1977, and these returns were excluded. Because the 1976 tax act pro- 
vided for substantial modifications in the estate tax schedule beginning in 
1977, it is quite difficult to guess what effect the new provisions had on be- 
quests by decedents who died early in 1977. Finally, estates smaller than 
$5000 were excluded in order to focus on decedents with at least a mini- 
mum of net worth.*' The resulting sample consisted of 6621 returns. A 
second sample consisting of all estates of $1 million or more was used in 
order to estimate separate behavioral parameters for the wealthiest dece- 
dents. This sample contained 2302 returns. 
The basic measure of estate size in this analysis is net estate (NE), de- 
fined as economic estate plus lifetime transfers minus the estate tax liabil- 
ity calculated without the charitable deduction. Adjusted disposable es- 
tate, defined as economic estate minus the tax, is used as an alternative. 
The new estate 'measure is preferred because it, like the charitable-giving 
measure, includes certain lifetime charitable gifts. The price of charitable 
bequests (P)  is one minus the marginal estate tax rate that would apply in 
the absence of bequests. As Feldstein (1977) has emphasized, this price is 
exogenous with respect to the charitable-bequest decision if  other deduc- 
tions, in particular the marital deduction, are predetermined. In fact, the 
assumption that a person  decides on the  amount of  the bequest to a 
spouse, up to  half the estate, before deciding on charitable bequests seems 
reasonable. In practice, married decedents almost always left at least half 
of  their estates to spouses. Previous research suggests that bequests are 
strongly influenced by both the age and marital status of decedents. The 
present study employs quite detailed measures of each in order to control 
for these important effects. Age at death was entered as a set of dichoto- 
mous variables for ages 50 to 59,60 to 69,70  to 79, and 80 and older. The 
excluded group consists of those under 50. Marital status was denoted by 
dichotomous variables for widows and widowers, single individuals, and 
21. Preliminary analysis showed, however, that there were relatively few estates below this 
level and that their exclusion had little effect on the estimates. 242  Charitable Bequests 
those divorced or separated, with married individuals being the excluded 
group. 
6.4.1  Estimates for All Estates 
Table 6.8 gives the mean values for the principal variables employed in 
the  analysis.  The mean  charitable bequest  for the  sample was  about 
$32,000. The average gross estate was about $558,000,  and the average 
economic estate was $465,000. Adjusting for lifetime gifts in gross estate 
and taxes yields net estate, with a mean value of about $407,000. The aver- 
age net price of  making  charitable bequests for the  sample was  0.77. 
About 35 percent of the decedents were over 80, and another 29 percent 
were in their 70s. One-half of the decedents were married and another 
third were widowed. Only 8 percent were never married. 
Table 6.8 
FuNsample 
Charitable deduction, in thousands (CB)  32.3 
Gross estate, in thousands  558.4 
Economic estate, in thousands  465.4 
Estate tax if no  charitable deductions, after credits, in thousands  108.6 
Lifetime transfers in gross estate, in thousands  50.6 
Net estate, in thousands (NE)  407.4 
Net price (P)  0.774 






80 and over 
Marital status 
Marrieda 
Widow or widower 
Single 
Divorced or separated 
By estate size (in thousands) 
Less than $250 
$250 under 500 
$500 under 1000 










Price  Net estate  (N) 
.689  382.5  (1 188) 
.545  2134.3  ( 487) 
.860  123.8  (3887) 
.660  681.9  (1059) 
Note: Sample size was 6621. 
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Three basic equations explaining the logarithm of charitable bequests 
are presented in table 6.9. The first two imply constant price and estate- 
size elasticities while the third allows for variation in the price elasticity. In 
equation (A) the Tobit coefficient of -  11.8 for the logarithm of price im- 
plies an elasticity of expected charitable bequests with respect to the price 
of -  1.67.22  While this estimate exceeds in absolute value the overall elas- 
Table 6.9  Logarithmic Equations Explaining Charitable Bequests, 1976 
Explanatory 
Variables 
In P  -  11.8 
(2.7) 
[ -  1.671 
-  20.4 
(2.3) 
[-2.791 
Inl? P < .60 
he .80 > P 2 .60 






































-  34.4 
645 1 
0.137 
-  12.9 
(2.8) 
[ -  1.771 
-  17.9 
(3.4) 
[ -  2.461 













-  42.6 
0.138 
662 1 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients except those noted by 
double asterisks were statistically different from zero at the 95 percent level. The numbers in 
brackets are elasticities of the expected value of the dependent variable with respect to the ex- 
planatory variable. 
22. Where b is the Tobit coefficient shown, and F(z)  is the cumulative normal distribution 
signifying the predicted probability of observing a positive bequest, the elasticity is bF(z). 
See, for example, McDonald and Moffit 1980. 244  Charitable Bequests 
ticity obtained by Boskin for the 1957-59 data, it does not appear beyond 
the bounds of his 1969 estimates. The present estimate also falls well within 
the spread of values obtained by Feldstein (1977). The estate-size elasticity 
of 0.42 is quite close to that obtained by Barthold and Plotnick and by 
Boskin  for 1969 and is somewhat smaller than Boskin’s estimates for 
1957-59. These estimates for the basic equation imply that bequest giving 
is affected both by estate size and the net price of giving. In addition, the 
latter effect is quite strong. 
Before comparing price and income elasticities implied by various func- 
tional forms, it is useful to examine the estimated effects of age and mari- 
tal status on bequest giving. The size of charitable bequests rises sharply 
with the age of the decedent. Although there is no significant difference 
between the gifts of decedents under 50-the  excluded group-and  those 
in their 50s, decedents 60 and older gave significantly more. Furthermore, 
the estimated age effects are monotonic. For example, equation (A) im- 
plies that decedents in their 70s gave 30 percent more than those in their 
60s, and those over 80 gave 40  percent more than those in their ~OS.*~  This 
increase in charitable giving with age is of  course strikingly similar to the 
age pattern observed in giving by living donors. 
The differences in bequest giving by marital status are also noteworthy. 
The group with the highest expected level of bequest giving is single dece- 
dents. Expected bequest giving by this group was over four times as high 
as that by married individuals. That single decedents give more than those 
who left spouses is not surprising since these decedents are also likely to 
have the fewest potential heirs within the family. This result also corre- 
sponds to $he previous finding, noted above, that single and divorced de- 
cedents were least likely to employ trusts, instruments  most often de- 
signed to provide for family members. Divorced or separated decedents 
were next highest in giving, averaging 2.4 times the amount donated by 
married individuals. Widows and widowers, who had no spouse but pre- 
sumably did have roughly the same number of children as married dece- 
dents, gave at twice the rate as those who were married. The age and mari- 
tal  status effects  observed  in  equation  (A)  are mirrored  in the other 
equations presented below. From these results, it seems quite evident that 
both age and marital status have important influences on the level of be- 
quest giving. 
Equations (B) and (C) are variations of the basic equation. In equation 
(B) net estate is replaced by adjusted disposable estate. The implied estate- 
size elasticity is less than half the size of that in equation (A), probably re- 
23. Where b; is the Tobit coefficient for age group  i, the ratio of giving between group iand 
group i-  1 is exp (F(z)(b;-  b;-  1)). 245  Charitable Bequests 
flecting the fact that the estate measure excludes lifetime gifts, some of 
which are included in the charitable deduction. The estimated price elas- 
ticity (- 2.79), on the other hand, is much larger in absolute value than the 
corresponding elasticity in (A). The age and marital status variables are 
generally similar. In equation (C)  the price elasticity is allowed to vary 
among estates according to three broad price categories, a variation that 
was suggested by the Boskin study noted above. Donors facing the lowest 
price (less than .60), those with the largest estates, had the smallest abso- 
lute price elasticity, -  1.77. Those with prices between .60 and .80 had an 
elasticity of -  2.46, and those in the highest price category had an implied 
elasticity of  -  3.70. This pattern of  larger absolute elasticity values for 
smaller estates (higher prices) corresponds to Boskin’s results for both the 
1957-59 and the 1969 samples. However, the elasticities implied by the 
present analysis are consistently larger in absolute value. Moreover, the 
larger price elasticities found in the present analysis do not appear to be 
due to the functional forms that are used. A reestimation of Boskin’s re- 
gression shown in equation (2) yielded much larger price elasticities and 
smaller estate elasticities than those implied by Boskin’s e~timates.~~ 
One of the most important questions for tax policy is whether the price 
elasticity and the elasticity with respect to estate size vary significantly 
among estates of  different sizes. This issue is  addressed by  Boskin and 
Feldstein and in tables 6.9 and 6.10 of the current chapter with different 
functional forms that allow some variation in elasticities. A more general 
functional form that allows interactions and nonlinear effects without 
specifying price or estate-size categories in the variable is a translog form. 
The estimated Tobit equation based on this form for the 1976 sample was: 
(3)  In  CB = -  121.9 In P - 23.9 In NE + 22.2 In P In NE 
+ 31.7 (In P)2 + 2.95 (In ADE)2 +  1.60 (Age 50-59) 
+ 4.49 (Age 60-69)  + 6.50 (Age 70-79)  + 8.12 (Age 80+) 
+ 4.81 Widow  +  10.62 Single + 6.25 Divorced  +  17.0, 
F(z) = 0.135, N  = 6621. 
24. The equation was: 
CB = 0.0138 NE - 5564 P(P < 0.6) - 5158 P(0.8 > P  2 0.6) 
-4397  P(P 2 .80) - 284 Married - 244 (Age < 65) 
+ 2885, F(z) = 0.976. 
The price elasticities calculated at the mean giving for the sample and mean price for each 
group are -  8.3, -  10.8, and -  12.4 from lowest to highest price category. The estimated estate- 
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The price and estate elasticities may be caculated by differentiating the 
equation and substituting appropriate values of price and estate size. Be- 
cause of the interaction and squared terms both elasticities depend on the 
value of the price and the estate size. To illustrate the pattern of  implied 
price and estate effects, table 6.10 presents elasticities calculated for the 
mean values corresponding to four estate-size classes. For comparison, it 
also presents elasticities based on the translog form using adjusted dispos- 
able estate. Both equations support the earlier finding that the price elas- 
ticity tends to shrink as estate size increases. In the equation using net es- 
tate, the elasticity is -  3.3 for the average net estate under $250,000 and 
goes in the positive direction until it is + 1.36 for the largest estate class, a 
result that ranks with the implausible estimates obtained  by  Feldstein. 
These price elasticities appear to be balanced by an equally large variation 
in estate elasticities, from 0.17 for the smallest estates to 1.08 in the larg- 
est. The equation using adjusted disposable estate shows a similar pattern, 
but with less variation in both elasticities. For estates over $1 million it im- 
plies a price elasticity of -  1.42 and income elasticity of 0.34. While the 
two equations yield  similar elasticities for the  lowest estate-size class, 
therefore, there is considerable difference at the top end. 
Given the strong effects of age and marital status apparent in the equa- 
tions above, it is useful to explore, finally, whether the price elasticity of 
bequest giving varies according to such personal characteristics. It is par- 
ticularly interesting to determine whether the charitable bequests of single 
individuals show any greater price sensitivity than others, in light of  the 
general lesser importance of family ties to single individuals, coupled with 
Table 6.10  Elasticities of Charitable Bequests Based on Translog Function 
Estate Class (thousands) 
Elasticities by 
Estate  $250 under  $500 under  $lo00 or 
Definition  Under $250  500  lo00  more 
Net estate 
Price  -  3.30  -  1.81  -  0.46  1.36 




Price  -  3.39  -2.61  -2.19  -  1.42 
Estate size  0.21  0.23  0.29  0.34 
Note: The sample sizes for the regressions were 6621 using net estate and 6451 using 
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their higher rate of bequest giving. To test for such differential price sensi- 
tivity, equation (A) in table 6.9 was reestimated by splitting the price term 
between single decedents and others. The implied price elasticities, shown 
in table 6.11, were -  2.30 for single individuals and -  1.64 for others, the 
latter being roughly the same overall price elasticity estimated in table 6.9, 
equation (A). Although these point estimates tend to  support the hypoth- 
esis that single decedents are more responsive to tax-induced price effects 
in their charitable bequests, the difference is not statistically significant. If 
it exists, this difference may be in part due to  the availability to married in- 
dividuals of  the marital  deduction and its increasing attractiveness  at 
higher marginal tax rates. A similar specification was employed to deter- 
mine whether this marital status effect differs by age group as well. As 
shown in the second part of table 6.11, there is little difference in price re- 
sponsiveness by age among single decedents. For others, the price elastic- 
ity for those 60 or over is approximately the same as for the entire sample. 
For those comparatively few decedents under 60 years of age, the price 
term is small and not significantly different from zero. Again, the differ- 
ences among the coefficients are small relative to the estimated standard 
errors. 
6.4.2  Estimates for Large Estates 
Because of the very large share of total bequests given by the wealthiest 
decedents, it is especially important to focus on the price and estate-size 
elasticities for these decedents. The estimates presented above clearly do 
not yield definitive estimates for these larger estates. In order to provide 
better information on the responsiveness of these decedents to taxes, be- 
quests by those with net estates over $1 million or more were analyzed sep- 
arately. The average net estate size in this class was $2.2 million. 
Table 6.11  Price Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Elasticities by Marital Status 
and Age Group 
Single  Nonsingle 
All  -  16.29 
(5.02) 
[ -  2.301 
Under 60  -  17.14** 
(9.18) 
[ -  2.421 
60 and over  -  16.32 
(5.02) 
[ -2.311 
-  11.65 
(2.74) 
[ -  1.641 
-7.12** 
(5.88) 
[ -  1.091 
-11.80 
(2.74) 
[ -  1.67) 
Note:  All coefficients except those denoted by double asterisks were significantly different 
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For this group the estimated basic model is given in equation (4), which 
is estimated again using Tobit: 
(4) In  CB = -  6.22 In P + 3.04 In NE  + 1.52 (Age 50-59) 
(2.44)  (1.01)  (2.98) 
[ -  2.661  [1.30] 
+ 7.33 (Age 60-69)  + 9.55 (Age 70-79)  + 12.04 (Age 80+) 
(2.73)  (2.69)  (2.69) 
+ 3.16 Widow  + 7.40 Single + 3.06 Divorced - 39.6, 
(0.79)  (1.20)  (1.57)  (7.0) 
F(z) = 0.427, N = 2302. 
The coefficient of -  6.22 for price implies an elasticity of the expected value 
of bequests of -  2.66, and the corresponding estate-size elasticity is 1.30. 
Both of these estimates are clearly larger in absolute value than the values 
implied for large estates by the equations covering estates of all size. Their 
standard errors are also relatively larger, which is probably a reflection of 
the higher correlation between price and estate size for this more homo- 
geneous group. The 95 percent confidence interval for the price elasticity 
is  -0.61  to -4.70.  While this range allows rejection of the hypothesis 
that the price elasticity is zero or positive, it nevertheless leaves consider- 
able scope for uncertainty about the price response. For the estate elastic- 
ity the 95 percent confidence interval is 0.45 to 2.14, the lower value being 
close to the elasticity implied in the basic model (A) in table 6.9. To sum- 
marize, the point estimates in equation (4) imply that the estate tax exerts 
strong price and estate-size effects on bequests by very wealthy decedents, 
but these estimates are not extremely precise. The effects of age and mari- 
tal status show similar patterns to those observed in equations for cover- 
ing all estate classes, but the implied differences among groups are uni- 
formly greater. 
6.5  Summary and Implications 
The deduction for charitable gifts in the estate tax complements the 
charitable deduction in the individual income tax by treating gifts at death 
in roughly the same way as lifetime giving. Although charitable bequests 
have averaged less than 10 percent of total giving, they are a significant 
portion of the total as well as a large percentage of gifts to certain types of 
organizations. The deduction has been a constant fixture of the tax over 
the years, but the changes in the effective tax schedule of  the estate tax 
have altered tax liabilities and the relative price of charitable bequests. 249  Charitable Bequests 
There has been a limited amount of econometric analysis of bequest 
giving. Three basic conclusions emerge from it. First, bequests appear to 
be subject to a tax-induced price effect in much the same way as are contri- 
butions by living individuals.  Second, the price elasticity of  decedents 
with the largest estates appears to be not as large in absolute value as the 
elasticity of  those with smaller estates. The third conclusion from the 
econometric work is a cautionary one, however. The estimates so far pro- 
duced have not been as robust as those for individual giving. The esti- 
mates obtained by Boskin and those presented here appear most robust, 
but all together the econometric analysis of bequest giving suggests that 
point estimates should be applied only with caution. 
With these reservations in mind, it is useful to consider the effect of  re- 
cent and possible changes in the estate tax on charitable bequests. The ef- 
fect of  past tax policy can be understood only in the context of inflation; 
the consequence of policy and inflation was to raise marginal tax rates be- 
tween 1943 and 1976 and increase bequest giving. Because the estate tax 
schedule was fixed in nominal terms over this period, an increasing pro- 
portion of  estates became subject to the tax; thus the incentive effect of 
the deduction spread to more estates over time. In addition, as table 6.1 
shows, the marginal tax rates applying to the largest estates rose over time, 
thus reducing the net price of bequest giving. For estates of $5 million in 
1972 dollars, the increase in marginal tax rates resulted in a 45 percent de- 
crease in price, from 0.55 to 0.30. 
The changes since 1976 have reversed these trends. Tax legislation in 
1976 and 1981 increased the minimum taxable estates through increases in 
the unified credit and lowered marginal tax rates for larger estates. The 
top marginal rate was reduced from 77 before 1976 to 70 percent between 
1977 and 1981, and then, in steps, to 50 percent in 1985. As illustrated in 
table 6.1, this decline in tax rates implies for estates of  $5 million in con- 
stant dollars an increase of almost 29 percent in the price of giving. An- 
other change in the  1981 bill was the unlimited marital deduction. Al- 
though this provision certainly could have a significant impact on outright 
bequests by a married decedent, its long-run effect is likely to  be consider- 
ably less since the marital exemption in the gift tax has long provided a 
limited means of delaying transfer taxation and since the estate is taxed at 
the time of the spouse’s death.25  The most important result of the 1981 tax 
25. The 1981  law  provided  for special treatment of  split-interest charitable remainder 
trusts. Under this treatment, a charitable deduction is allowed for the charitable portion at 
the time of death of the first spouse if the trust qualifies as a deductible charitable remainder 
unitrust or annuity trust and if the only noncharitable beneficiaries are the decedent or  the 
spouse. This removes any incentive to make bequests to a spouse rather than leave a charita- 
ble bequest in a split-interest charitable remainder trust.  See U.S. Congress, Staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation 1981, p. 238, or Arthur Andersen and Company 1982, pp. 48- 
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act on bequest giving appears to be, then, the restructuring of marginal 
tax rates, particularly the drop in tax rates for the very largest estates. 
In order to give a rough idea of the effect of the post-1976 tax changes 
on bequests, table 6.12 presents two simulations of the change in bequest 
giving between 1976 and 1987. The number of estates by constant dollar 
class was assumed to be constant, and gross estate minus debt was as- 
sumed to increase with the price level. Taxes and tax rates were calculated 
using the respective tax schedules for 1976 and 1987. As can be seen in the 
third and fourth columns, the 1981 tax changes remove the tax liability for 
estates below $500,000 in 1976 dollars. Except in the $3 to  $5 million class, 
estates larger than $500,000 will experience a decline in taxes. For the larg- 
est estate class the projected reduction in tax liability is 29 percent. Mar- 
ginal tax rates for estates paying no tax in 1987 become zero, of course. 
Marginal rates for estates between $500,000 and $5 million are projected 
to rise while rates in the top two classes will fall. 
Bequests in 1987 were estimated using the new values of net estate and 
price implied by these changes. For estates below $1 million, elasticity Val- 
ues of -  1.6 for price and 0.4 for net estate were used. For estates over $1 
million two sets of elasticities were used. The assumed price elasticity for 
this group was -  1.0 in simulation I and  -2.4  in simulation 11.  Estate 
elasticities for these top classes were 0.4 and 1.3 in simulations I and 11, re- 
spectively. The first simulation generally reflects the results of equations 
based on estates of all sizes, while the second reflects the point estimates in 
equation (4). While these parameter values do not reflect the full variabil- 
ity of the parameter estimates, they are used to illustrate the implications 
of different values. 
Both simulations imply that the 1981 estate tax changes will reduce be- 
quest giving in real terms. Simulation I, using the comparatively smaller 
price elasticity for large estates, implies a fall in total bequests of 34 per- 
cent. The projected decline in the top class is over 50 percent. The second 
simulation, which gives greater weight to price changes as well as changes 
in net estate for wealthy decedents, implies even bigger declines. Total be- 
quests fall by 52 percent, paced by a sharp decline in bequest giving in the 
top class. Obviously, the sheer size of bequests by the largest estates tends 
to dominate the overall change in bequests. Using methods such as those 
employed here, it is possible to project the likely effects of other changes 
in the estate tax, such as the elimination of the charitable deduction or its 
replacement with a credit. It is clear from the estimation and simulation 
results presented in this chapter, though, that the uncertainty surrounding 
the estimates of price and estate elasticities should serve as a caution flag 
in predicting the outcome of tax changes. As in discussing simulations of 
individual giving in chapter 3, two potential sources of error must be con- 
sidered. First, the statistical uncertainty surrounding the coefficient esti- 
mates is important and much larger than that associated with models of Table 6.12 
Gross Estate  Charitable  Simulated Charitable Bequests, 
Estates, Charitable Bequests, and Taxes-1976  and 1987, Based on Taxable Estates in 1976 (dollar amounts in 1976 dollars) 
Class  Bequests  Average Estate Tax Less Credits 
(thousands)  (millions)  1976  4987 
Marginal Tax Rate 
1976  I987 
1987 (millions)a 
































































































































Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1976,  Estate Tax Returns 1979, p. 8; pp. 15-19, table 1; and p. 27, table 5; Internal Revenue 
Code 1982, sec. 2001 and 2002, pp. 847,849. 
aPrice elasticities used in simulations were: for estates less than $1 million: -  1.6; for estates over $1 million: -  1 .O in I and -  2.4 in 11. Estate elasticities were: 
0.4 for all estates in I and estates less than $1 million in 11;  I .3 for estates over $I million in 11. 252  Charitable Bequests 
individual giving. Second, fundamental shifts in giving patterns, due per- 
haps to an increased need by donees, could also modify the changes pre- 
dicted by static econometric models. Having noted these caveats, one can 
summarize the findings of this section by stating that, other things equal, 
the 1981 tax act will probably cause a significant decline in real bequest 
giving and that the effect in the largest estates will predominate. 